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Introduction: Remembering Dictatorship: State Socialist Pasts in Post-Socialist 
Presents 
Sara Jones and Debbie Pinfold 
 
Anniversaries are tricky things. The year 2014 marks twenty-five years since the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and what for many is seen as the end of state socialist rule in 
Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, this date holds different meanings for different post-
socialist states: where Hungary saw a negotiated transition from socialist to market 
economic structures, in Romania, 1989 was marked by violent revolution and the 
dramatic execution of the dictator. In the Baltic States, 1989 is perhaps less significant 
than 1991 – the year which saw the end of Soviet rule and independence for Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia. Even before this watershed, the experience of state socialism 
itself was equally diverse, with the ‘Goulash communism’ of Hungary and the brutal 
Ceauşescu regime once again occupying opposite ends of the spectrum. Within 
individual nations, the memories associated with this part of twentieth-century 
European history vary dramatically: accounts of extensive surveillance and state 
repression clash with sometimes nostalgic reflections on the security (particularly 
economic security) that the socialist system provided. Moreover, twenty-five years on, 
an entire generation has grown up with no direct experience of dictatorship and only 
mediated memories of this period.  
This diversity calls into question the very endeavour we are embarking on in 
this special issue. Can we really speak of remembering state socialism? Would this 
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not require some agreed upon definition of what state socialism was or might be? It is 
here that the plurals of our subtitle becomes important – there were many state 
socialist pasts, just as there are many post-socialist presents, not only across, but also 
within different countries. For a full understanding of what is happening in the region 
in terms of history, culture, memory and politics, recognition of this diversity is 
essential. Yet we would like to argue that we can, nonetheless, still speak of 
‘remembering dictatorship’, that is, that an analysis of these diverse contexts can 
reveal similarities in the processes of remembering, working through, or even coming 
to terms with dictatorial rule. In the following, we would like to explore further some 
of these similarities through the interdisciplinary lens of memory studies and suggest 
ways in which the essays presented here might be useful for understanding how 
collective memories of authoritarian regimes are produced, mediated and circulated in 
the democratic cultures of the present. One quarter of a century after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall would seem a particularly provident point to engage in this endeavour. 
We are at a moment in history when post-socialist populations still include individuals 
who experienced the early (and often more brutal) years of dictatorship, those who 
were born into the socialist system and whose formative years were in the (in some 
contexts) more liberal and prosperous 1970s and 1980s, and the new generation who 
have access to this past through mediated memories alone. At a political level, many 
Eastern European countries are endeavouring to negotiate their place in the enlarged 
European Union, including both adapting to and transforming existing EU memory 
practices.1 This places us at a point of transition between the communicative 
memories of those with direct experience of state socialism and the cultural and 
                                                 
 
1 See David Clarke’s contribution to this special issue. 
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political memories that will determine how it is collectively remembered in the future. 
Thus it is now that we can observe how this transition is negotiated and the role of 
different actors in this process. 
Aleida Assmann has divided memory into four formats: individual, social, 
cultural and political.2 This introductory essay will be structured loosely around these 
four formats, but will take into consideration in particular how the different modes of 
memory interact. As Arnold-de-Simine and Radstone argue, ‘although Assmann’s 
terminology is useful for formulating research questions, these differentiations and 
classifications can at best function as heuristic tools’. In particular, we must not allow 
these heuristic distinctions to cloud analysis of ‘how the political and the psychical, 
the public and the private, and the individuals and society interact with and inform 
each other in processes of remembering’.3 A further critique of Assmann’s typology is 
that it bypasses consideration of the specific role of media in representations of the 
past, or, where the medium is incorporated into the analysis, there is a tendency to 
view it as purely a storage technology, rather than an active component in shaping 
                                                 
 
2 Aleida Assmann, 'Four Formats of Memory: From Individual to Collective 
Constructions of the Past' in Cultural Memory and Historical Consciousness in the 
German-Speaking World Since 1500, ed. by Christian Emden and David Midgley 
(Oxford, 2004), pp. 19-37 and Aleida Assmann, Der lange Schatten der 
Vergangenheit: Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik (Munich, 2006), p. 36. 
3 Silke Arnold-de-Simine and Susannah Radstone, ‘The GDR and the Memory 
Debate’, in, Remembering and Rethinking the GDR: Multiple Perspectives and Plural 
Authenticities, ed. by Anna Saunders and Debbie Pinfold (Basingstoke, 2013), pp. 19-
33 (pp. 25-26). 
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what is and can be remembered.4 Bearing these potential objections in mind, we have 
modified and added to Assmann’s typology and will consider: individual 
remembering in collective context; community remembering; mediation of memory; 
narratives of memory; and political memory. 
Individual Remembering in a Collective Context 
Individual memory for Assmann is the personal, neuronal memory that each of us has 
of our past experiences and which shapes our relationships and identity. This form of 
memory – as all forms of memory – does not record the past exactly; rather it is 
deceptive, subjective and changeable.5 Moreover, individual memories ‘do not exist in 
isolation, but are networked with the memories of others’ and it is in their ability to 
overlap and connect within a particular group that they have the potential to be 
community-building.6 Here Assmann draws on the seminal work of Maurice 
Halbwachs, who argued as early as the 1920s that the individual neither acquires nor 
recalls his or her memories in isolation, but rather in society. Halbwachs contended 
that to remember we turn outward, rather than inward; memories are ‘recalled to me 
externally, and the groups of which I am a part at any time give me the means to 
reconstruct them’. This is the basis for Halbwachs’s social frames of memory, the 
                                                 
 
4 See José van Dijck, Mediated Memories in the Digital Age (Stanford, 2007), p. 14; 
Franziska Sick and Beate Ochsner, ‘Einleitung’, in Medium und Gedächtnis: Von der 
Überbietung der Grenze(n), ed. by Franziska Sick and Beate Ochsner (Frankfurt am 
Main, 2004), pp. 7-29 (p. 13); Martin Zierold, Gesellschaftliche Erinnerung: Eine 
medienkulturwissenschaftliche Perspektive (Berlin, 2006), p. 89. 
5 Assmann, Der lange Schatten, pp. 23-26. 
6 Ibid., p. 24. Italics in original; all translations from German are our own. 
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collective frameworks, which are, in his words, ‘precisely the instruments used by the 
collective memory to reconstruct an image of the past which is in accord, in each 
epoch, with the predominant thoughts of the society’.7 
Individual memories are thus reliant on and shaped by communication with 
others and yet they remain individual and particular. Moreover, collective memory 
can only exist through individual appropriation of common symbols, narratives and 
structures. Here Olick’s observation of ‘an unresolved tension between individualist 
and collectivist strains running through Halbwachs’s work’ can be of use.8 Olick 
argues that collective memory appears to have two distinct meanings: ‘socially framed 
individual memories and collective commemorative representations and mnemonic 
traces’. He suggests a division of the term into ‘collected memory’, and ‘collective 
memory’. Collected memory is ‘the aggregated individual memories of members of a 
group’, shaped by (and also shaping) the social frameworks in which they remember. 
In this form, the individual is the centre of analysis and ‘shared symbols and deep 
structures are only real insofar as individuals […] treat them as such’. Approaches 
based on collective memory, in contrast, assert that ‘ideas, styles, genres, and 
discourses […] are more than the aggregations of individual subjectivities’ and that 
‘groups provide the definitions, as well as the divisions, by which particular events are 
subjectively defined as consequential’.9 
                                                 
 
7 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. and tr. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago 
and London, 1992), pp. 38, 40. 
8 Jeffrey K. Olick, ‘Collective Memory: The Two Cultures’, in Sociological Theory 17 
(1999), 333-48 (p. 334). 
9 Ibid., pp. 336, 338, 342, 341. 
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So how does this relate to our context? We can see that individual memory, 
based on personal experience, plays an essential role in publicly performed memories 
of state socialism. It is in a complex interaction between particular experiences in the 
past and the present political and social context that individual memories are produced 
and narrated: that is, memories of life under state socialism are refracted through 
present circumstances. Following Olick, we can understand this as collected memory. 
And yet it might also be argued that within a given social context there are a limited 
number of discursive strategies available to individuals and these narrative structures 
are provided by the wider mnemonic community: the tendency to classify the 
rememberer in an often undifferentiated way as ‘victim’, ‘secret police informant’, 
‘Securist’, ‘communist functionary’, ‘nostalgic’ is evidence for this point. In order to 
be intelligible and received as authentic, accounts about the past cannot deviate too far 
from expected patterns and may even have to follow culturally-determined ‘schematic 
narrative templates’ in a process that Wertsch describes as ‘deep collective 
memory’.10 As Wertsch and Roediger outline with reference to the work of 
MacIntyre, the remembering individual is the active agent, ‘and every use of these 
[narrative] tools is unique […], but this performance is viewed as harnessing items in 
[…] society’s “stock of stories”’.11 
Jeremy Morris’s contribution to this special issue highlights further the ways in 
which individual memories can interact with the collective in post-socialist space. For 
the Russian workers who are the subject of Morris’s ethnographic study, the end of 
                                                 
 
10 James V. Wertsch, ‘Collective Memory’, in Memory in Mind and Culture, ed. by 
Pascal Boyer and James V. Wertsch (Cambridge, 2009), pp.117-37 (p. 130). 
11 James V. Wertsch and Henry L. Roediger III, ‘Collective Memory: Conceptual 
Foundations and Theoretical Approaches’, in Memory 16 (2008), 318-26 (p. 324). 
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state socialism functions as a demarcation line separating past from present. Just as 
present experiences are framed by reference to the past, so memories of the past are 
refracted by experiences of a decline in economic and social status in the post-
socialist period. Morris demonstrates that while these memories and experiences are 
individual – attached to a named informant – they are also communal, in the sense 
that they are shared by and within a specific (classed) group and serve to reinforce the 
bonds between these individuals. Moreover, the ‘mnemonic resources’ that Morris’s 
informants draw on in their narrations of the past go beyond autobiographical memory 
to include shared cultural values that are presented by these individuals as being an 
essential part of their group identity that spans the divide of 1991. 
In this process, material objects – be it cacti or fridges – are invested with 
mnemonic power, coming to represent a link between socialism and post-socialism. 
We might view these objects as a particular kind of ‘personal cultural memory’. Van 
Dijck uses this term to describe those ‘shoe box’ items (for example, diaries, 
photographs, and home videos) that we create and collect to remind us of significant 
life events. These objects are personal, rather than public; yet they are structured by 
cultural conventions and social frameworks.12 In contrast to the items considered in 
van Dijck’s model, the objects ascribed mnemonic significance by Morris’s 
informants were not created as products of remembering; nonetheless, they come to 
function as triggers for communal narratives that connect past and present, as well as 
individual and social remembering. Here we can draw parallels between this use of 
                                                 
 
12 José van Dijck, ‘Mediated Memories: Personal Cultural Memory as Object of 
Cultural Analysis’, in Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 18 (2004), 
261-77; José van Dijck, Mediated Memories. 
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mnemonic resources in post-Soviet space, and the surge in interest in the material 
culture of state socialism, in particular in eastern Germany, where objects from the 
former GDR have been resurrected as both products of consumption and museum 
artefacts.13 
Community Remembering 
Morris’s study also points towards the importance of generations in the process of 
constructing memory. The younger generation’s experiences of both socialism and 
post-socialism are quite different from those of the parents; nonetheless, through 
intergenerational remembering, the narratives of the older generation do have an 
impact on the ways in which the children understand their lives, as they compare 
present circumstances to their parents’ descriptions of life in the Soviet Union. This 
reflects Assmann’s definition of the second form of memory: social memory. 
Building on Karl Mannheim’s concept of generations as based on the similar 
formative historical experiences of individuals of approximately the same age, 
Assmann argues that different generations have different values, identities and, 
                                                 
 
13 There is a vast amount of critical literature on East German material culture, dealing 
with both its return as product of consumption and its role in museums of everyday 
life. See for example Jonathan Bach, ‘“The Taste Remains”: Consumption, 
(N)ostalgia, and the Production of East Germany’, in Public Culture 14 (2002), 545-
56; Silke Arnold-de Simine, ‘“The Spirit of an Epoch Is Not Just Reflected in Pictures 
and Books, but Also in Pots and Frying Pans”: GDR Museums and Memories of 
Everyday Life’, in The GDR Remembered: Representations of the East German State 
since 1989, ed. by Nick Hodgin and Caroline Pearce (Rochester, 2011), pp. 95-111. 
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therefore, memories, which coexist and conflict with one another in a given society.14 
Morris’s study demonstrates the ways in which each generation’s understanding of the 
past and its relationship to the present is refracted by the narratives and experiences of 
both older and younger members of their social group. 
Nonetheless, Assmann’s model tends to suggest a homogenous society, in 
which the formative historical experiences of individuals of approximately the same 
age are similar enough to constitute group identity. Is this in fact always, or even 
usually, the case, particularly in the post-socialist context, in which historical 
experiences varied so significantly according to nationality, class and social position? 
While certain phenomena suggest that the concept of generations might be a useful 
heuristic tool – for example, the wave of more or less controversial texts published by 
the ‘Zonenkinder’ of eastern Germany15 – focusing exclusively on this aspect may 
                                                 
 
14 Assmann, ‘Four Formats’, pp. 23-24 and Assmann, Der lange Schatten der 
Vergangenheit, pp. 26-27. 
15 This phenomenon has attracted considerable scholarly attention: see for example 
Owen Evans, ‘“Denn wir sind anders”: “Zonenkinder” in the Federal Republic’, in 
German as a foreign language, 2 (2005), 20-33; Susanne Ledanff, ‘Neue Formen der 
“Ostalgie” – Abschied von der Ostalgie?” Erinnerungen an Kindheit und Jugend in 
der DDR und an die Geschichtsjahre 1989/90’, in seminar 43 (2007), 176-93; Bernd 
Lindner, ‘Biographien aus einem verschwundenen Land: Die Jugendgenerationen der 
DDR in literarischen Selbstbildern’, in BIOS: Zeitschrift für Biografieforschung, Oral 
History und Lebenslaufanalysen, 16 (2003), 190-205. Those born in the former GDR 
between 1975 and 1985 are also beginning to make their voices heard in the public 
sphere through the umbrella organisation Dritte Generation Ostdeutschland, founded 
around the time of the twentieth anniversary of reunification in 2010. See 
http://www.dritte-generation-ost.de/3te_generation/index.html (accessed 27 March 
2014).  
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risk overlooking the importance of other types of mnemonic community. Some of the 
memory battles of post-socialism are indeed fought across generational lines, notably 
concern that the younger generation are ignorant of the suffering of their parents and 
grandparents and overly influenced by nostalgic media representations of state 
socialism.16 However, in the Eastern European context, the battle lines would appear 
to be more frequently drawn not between generations, but between groups that define 
themselves in relation to their particular experience of the past: victim organisations 
conflict with groups of former state security officers, memories of ‘normal life’ clash 
with accounts that emphasise repression and total control.17 
This point is highlighted particularly well by Vieda Skultans’s contribution to 
this special issue. In the Baltic States, as Skultans demonstrates, it is not generation, 
but ethnicity that plays the central role in cementing group values and identity in 
relation to the past and in particular with regard to the Nazi and Soviet occupations 
(including contestation that this is even the right term). Skultans demonstrates that 
remembrance of World War II and its aftermath is divided along ethnic lines, with 
narratives of victory and liberation on the part of ethnic Russians challenging 
memories of oppression under Soviet rule on the part of ethnic Estonians, Latvians or 
                                                 
 
16 This, for example, was the response to the survey by Schroeder and Deutz-
Schroeder, which indicated that young Germans, particularly from the eastern states, 
had limited historical knowledge of the Cold War and were reluctant to characterise 
the GDR as a dictatorship. See Monika Deutz-Schroeder and Klaus Schroeder, Oh, 
wie schön ist die DDR: Kommentare und Materialien zu den Ergebnissen einer Studie 
(Schwalbach, 2009). 
17 For an analysis of how victim groups might define themselves linguistically on this 
basis, see: Sara Jones, ‘Catching Fleeting Memories: Victims Forums as Mediated 
Remembering Communities’, in Memory Studies 6 (2013), 390-403. 
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Lithuanians. It is in particular the difficulty of remembering those who were 
conscripted to fight on the side of the Nazis, and who may have viewed their 
engagement as a defence of the nation against Soviet aggressors, that causes conflict 
between these different mnemonic communities. Significantly, Skultans indicates that 
these divisions resist generational change, as young people with no direct memory of 
the contested events continue to participate in the memory wars of the present. 
Analysis of these memory wars points towards elements of Aleida Assmann’s 
cultural and political forms of memory. Memory of past injustices in the Baltic States 
is kept alive not only by trans-generational remembering of the kind seen also in 
Morris’s piece, but also by cultural memory in the form of monuments and 
memorials, and by political memory in the form of commemorations, supported to 
varying extents by state institutions. However, as Skultans demonstrates, these 
‘commemorations continue to feed upon living, albeit contrasting memories’ and are 
inextricably linked to them. Where this link is broken – for example, at Nelson’s 
Column in Trafalgar Square – the monument may serve as a lieu de mémoire in 
Nora’s understanding, that is, as a memory site to which the imagined community of 
the nation attaches itself.18 However, these monuments no longer serve as triggers for 
memory contests, such as those seen in the Baltic States and across the former Eastern 
Bloc. In this regard, it is important to view memory as an act or practice, rather than 
purely an object or artefact. Following Sturken, ‘a practice of memory is an activity 
that engages with, produces, reproduces and invests meaning in memories, whether 
                                                 
 
18 Pierre Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire’, in 
Representations 26 (1989), 7-24. 
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personal, cultural or collective’.19 We might, in this sense, speak of ‘collective 
remembering’ rather than ‘collective memory’, and ‘remembering communities’, 
rather than ‘memory communities’. The use of the active verb highlights the 
importance of ‘mediated action’ in collective constructions of the past20 and places 
emphasis on ‘the social and political contestation’ that plays a central role in these 
practices.21 
 
Mediation of Memory 
The dynamic nature of remembering should also be taken into account when we 
consider Aleida Assmann’s next form of memory: cultural memory. Here Aleida 
Assmann builds on the distinction drawn by Jan Assmann between the living 
‘communicative’ memory of the recent past, exchanged within and between up to 
three generations (usually in oral form), and cultural memory, which refers to the 
distant past, is fixed in cultural artefacts (for example, canonic texts, dance, ritual, 
songs, monuments), is institutionally secured and has a normative or formative 
function for the community.22 Consideration of the role of the medium in 
                                                 
 
19 Marita Sturken, ‘Memory, Consumerism and Media: Reflections on the Emergence 
of the Field’ in Memory Studies, 1 (2008), 73-78 (p. 74). 
20 Wertsch, ‘Collective Memory’, p. 119. 
21 Wertsch and Roediger, ‘Collective Memory’, p. 319. 
22 Jan Assmann, Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and 
Political Imagination (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 34-41. First published as: Jan Assmann, 
Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen 
Hochkulturen (Munich: Beck, 1992). See also Jan Assmann, ‘Collective Memory and 
Cultural Identity’, in New German Critique 65 (1995), 125-33 and Jan Assmann, 
‘Communicative and Cultural Memory’, in Cultural Memory Studies: an 
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communicative and cultural memory is not entirely absent from Aleida Assmann’s 
development of this model. Indeed, she has turned her attention explicitly to the media 
of memory, noting that, ‘each medium permits a specific access to cultural 
memory’.23 However, her understanding of media – be it literature, film, archives, or 
memorials – seems to be primarily as storage technologies, conserving memory for its 
re-appropriation in the present. While Assmann acknowledges the role of ‘carriers’, 
her analysis of the dynamics of cultural memory is largely limited to a distinction 
between the ‘active’ and the ‘archival’, essentially the memories which are present in 
public discourse at any given time and those which are latent, awaiting reactivation.24 
However, as Erll and Rigney point out ‘there is no cultural memory prior to 
mediation’ and the various media themselves, far from being ‘merely passive and 
transparent conveyors of information […] play an active role in shaping our 
understanding of the past’. In this context, Erll and Rigney develop a more dynamic 
understanding of cultural memory as an ‘ongoing process of remembering and 
forgetting’ in which ‘individuals and groups continue to reconfigure their relationship 
to the past’.25 This reconfiguring is the product of a complex process of mediation, 
                                                                                                                                            
 
International and Interdisciplinary Handbook, ed. by Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning 
(Berlin, 2008), pp. 109-18. 
23 Aleida Assmann, Erinnerungsräume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen 
Gedächtnisses (Munich, 1999), p. 20. 
24 Assmann, 'Four Formats, p. 31-32 and Assmann, Der lange Schatten, pp. 55-58. 
25 Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney, ‘Introduction’, in Mediation, Remediation and the 
Dynamics of Cultural Memory, ed. by Astrid Erll and Ann Rigney (Berlin, 2012), pp. 
1-11 (p. 2-4). 
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‘remediation’26 and premediation as different understandings of a shared past find 
expression in a range of media which interact in the public sphere. Such a dynamic 
understanding of media would seem particularly appropriate to an analysis of 
remembering in the ‘media-culture societies’27 of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. The post-socialist individual is immersed in a plethora of different media 
representations of the past – from literature and film to heritage and the new media.28 
Moreover, they have access to an equally broad range of media through which they 
can represent and transmit their own memories to a wider audience.29 Nonetheless, as 
Erll argues, media do not function as ‘neutral carriers of information about the past’.30 
Rather each form will leave its particular ‘trace’31 on the memories it produces. 
                                                 
 
26 See Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media 
(Cambridge, MA, 1999). 
27 Siegfried J. Schmidt, ‘Medien: Die Koppelung von Kommunikation und 
Kognition’, in Medien, Computer, Realität: Wirklichkeitsvorstellungen und Neue 
Medien, ed. by Sybille Krämer (Frankfurt am Main, 1998), pp. 55-72 (p. 55). 
28 See, for example, Paul Cooke, Representing East Germany since Unification: From 
Colonization to Nostalgia (Oxford, 2005). 
29 The new media in particular are often seen as part of a democratisation of memory 
in this regard. See Joanne Garde-Hansen, Andrew Hoskins and Anna Reading, 
‘Introduction’, in Save As…Digital Memories, ed. by Joanne Garde-Hansen, Andrew 
Hoskins and Anna Reading (Basingstoke, 2009), 1-21 (pp. 8-19); Jones, ‘Catching 
Fleeting Memories’. 
30 Astrid Erll, Memory in Culture, trans. by Sara B. Young (Basingstoke, 2011), p. 
114. 
31 Sybille Krämer, ‘Das Medium als Spur und als Apparat’, in Krämer, Medien, 
Computer, Realität: Wirklichkeitsvorstellungen und Neue Medien, pp. 73-94. 
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The significance of mediation is highlighted by Matthew Philpotts’s 
contribution. Philpotts analyses the complex of buildings at Prora on the Baltic Island 
of Rügen through the theoretical frameworks of heterotopia and palimpsest. This 
complex was initially designed as a Nazi ‘Strength through Joy’ (‘Kraft durch 
Freude’, KdF) site and in the 1980s served as accommodation for young GDR men 
who refused to serve in the National People’s Army (NVA) and were therefore 
conscripted to work as builders instead. Such apparently authentic sites – concrete 
evidence of past societies and their institutions – might appear to offer the visitor 
direct, unmediated, access to the past. However, Philpotts points to the particular 
significance of and ambivalence inherent in a ruin, which can be read as a ‘stark 
counterpoint to the grandiose ideological visions projected into the future by the 
socialist regimes’ or, in its continued existence and valorisation, as something which 
allows for ‘a nostalgic yearning for a lost past, whether individual or collective, 
personal or political’. The medium of the ruin is thus certainly not a ‘transparent 
conveyor of information’ in that its very physical presence shapes visitors’ 
understanding of the past and their relationship to it in potentially quite specific ways. 
Nonetheless, at the same time the ruin is not a prescriptive medium. In his 
discussion of the role of heritage as media, Silverstone argues that all museums, 
exhibitions and restorations, in common with other forms of mass communication 
media, are artefacts: 
Their relationship to something called ‘reality’, to history, to the other, is a 
function of that work, human work, and they require the viewer or the visitor 
to read, to follow and to work with what they see, hear, read or walk through. 
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In this sense all our media are texts […]. They all express more or less 
visibly the marks of their construction and their ideological inflection.32 
 
If such sites can be read and interpreted as literary texts, it follows that the position of 
the recipient cannot be excluded. Indeed, Mason argues that one advantage of 
understanding heritage in terms of texts and narratives is ‘that it raises the question of 
unintentional meanings, omissions, or contradictions present within displays’.33 Thus 
the ruin’s susceptibility to quite different readings renders it a potentially destabilising 
site. However, this plurality is anathema to a heritage industry which appears to take 
very seriously the singular of George Santayana’s dictum: ‘Those who cannot 
remember the past are condemned to repeat it’.34 Philpotts uses Sarah Dillon’s 
distinction between ‘palimpsestic’ and ‘palimpsestuous’ readings of such spaces to 
demonstrate that those responsible for preserving and maintaining Prora have largely 
adopted the more simplistic ‘palimpsestic’ approach of separating out the different 
layers of the history and emphasising those which facilitated the creation of reassuring 
messages for the present, rather than allowing visitors to experience the destabilising 
potential of the ruin.  
Nevertheless, while the overall approach to the site has been of this more 
controlling, simplifying variety, Philpotts also notes other more ‘palimpsestuous’ 
                                                 
 
32 Roger Silverstone, ‘Heritage as Media: Some Implications for Research’, in 
Heritage Interpretation, vol. 2: The Visitor Experience, ed. by David L. Uzzell 
(London, 1989), pp. 138-48 (p. 141). 
33 Rhiannon Mason, ‘Cultural Theory and Museum Studies’, in A Companion to 
Museum Studies, ed. by Sharon Macdonald (Oxford, 2006), pp. 17-32 (p. 27). 
34 George Santayana, The Life of Reason (London, 1905), vol. 1, p. 284. 
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approaches which resist top-down academic narratives and put greater responsibility 
for interpretation in the hands of the visitors. Such attempts help to challenge the neat, 
reassuring binaries that underlie the widespread general representation of dictatorship, 
and perhaps enable the visitor to come to a more nuanced understanding of both the 
past and her or his relationship to it. These contrasting approaches at Prora indicate 
that the ‘trace’ the medium leaves on memory is not only determined by the nature of 
the medium itself, but also by those individuals that Ashuri and Pinchevski, in their 
analysis of witness testimony, describe as the ‘mediators’: understood in our context 
as the curators, directors, filmmakers and editors who create the artefacts of cultural 
memory.35 This highlights once again the dynamic nature of cultural memory and the 
interaction between the social context (the narratives that are available and the 
meaning ascribed to them), the artefact and producers of culture, who play a central 
role in staging and structuring the past within the constraints of the particular media 
form. Moreover, while the mediator might suggest a dominant or hegemonic reading 
of the heritage ‘text’, in a further interplay between collective and individual memory, 
the recipient may respond with ‘oppositional’ or ‘negotiated’ interpretations.36 
                                                 
 
35 Tamar Ashuri and Amit Pinchevski, ‘Witnessing as a Field’, in Media Witnessing: 
Testimony in the Age of Mass Communication, ed. by Paul Frosh and Amit Pinchevski 
(Basingstoke, 2009), pp. 133-57 (p. 138). 
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Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe and Paul Willis (London, 1980), pp. 128-38. See also 
Ryan’s interpretation of Hall for collective memory studies: Lorraine Ryan, ‘Memory, 
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Narratives of Memory 
In his analysis of ‘deep collective memory’, Wertsch draws in part on the seminal 
work of folklorist Vladimir Propp and his identification of ‘generalized “functions” 
that characterize an entire set of narratives, as opposed to the particular events and 
actors that occur in specific narratives’. Following Wertsch, these can be understood 
as ‘schematic narrative templates’, which ‘function to exert a conservative, yet often 
unrecognized force on collective memory’.37 Similarly, the sociologist Harald Welzer 
demonstrates the interaction of cultural, social and medial remembering. He shows 
that ‘the things that we consider to be the most personal essential elements of our 
autobiography need not necessarily be based on our own experiences; rather they have 
often been imported into our life story from other sources, for example from books, 
films and narratives’.38 Welzer argues that alongside ‘direct imports from narrative 
segments and stories’ an even more significant impact of these cultural frames is the 
structuring effect of narrative: ‘in the process of “memory talk”, in the communal 
praxis of conversational memory, through every book read and every film seen, we 
have all learnt that a real story has a beginning, a middle and an end and that it should 
follow basic narrative patterns in order to be communicable’.39 
The turn to literary theory in these anthropological and sociological accounts 
suggests that we might also view these narratives in terms of genre. In his influential 
Metahistory, Hayden White points towards the implicit literary genres (Romance, 
                                                 
 
37 Wertsch, ‘Collective Memory’, p. 129, 130. 
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Tragedy, Comedy and Satire) invoked in the emplotment of the historical ‘chronicle’ 
and the implications of the chosen form for the representation of past structures and 
processes.40 Similarly, Erll highlights the importance of genre conventions for media 
analyses of collective remembering and notes that there are particular (transmedial) 
forms that are preferred for the encoding of the past.41 The genre conventions linked 
to these forms are likely to have an impact on both the production and reception of the 
memories they construct. As Erll and Nünning point out, ‘literary genres and their 
formal characteristics are closely related to conventionalized expectations’ and these 
expectations guide our reading experience: when reading a detective novel the reader 
familiar with the conventions of the genre expects to learn the solution to the case at 
the end.42 Like media then, (literary) genres are no mere transparent vessels for 
information, but structure the reader’s understanding.  
However, as we have seen in the discussion of Prora, this does not mean that 
there is only one way of reading a literary (or any other) narrative and literature in 
particular is characterised by the potential for multiple and potentially destabilising 
interpretations. Indeed, Aleida Assmann’s conception of cultural memory privileges 
the literary text as a medium which ‘translates and transcends the other memory 
formats’ by ‘disconnect[ing] them from individuals, groups and institutions that were 
                                                 
 
40 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century 
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once its carriers and reconnect[ing] them with an open community of readers’.43 In 
her analysis, physical sites and monuments tend to support political memory which is 
‘emplotted in a narrative that is emotionally charged and conveys a clear and 
invigorating message’;44 fiction, on the other hand, allows for greater complexity and 
ambiguity than physical sites. We might challenge this view of heritage as a medium 
constituted exclusively of singular narratives; however, it seems correct to assert that 
literary texts in particular allow for multiple voices and perspectives and a degree of 
human understanding for and even empathy with characters whose views we may find 
offensive. As Birgit Neumann argues, in offering multi-perspective narratives, texts 
can design a ‘panorama of co-existing collective memories’, through which both 
‘shared interpretations of the past, but also incompatible memories of the shared 
collective past become visible’.45 
Petra James’s contribution to this volume suggests that such reading experiences 
may have the potential to challenge well-established cultural paradigms. She 
considers recent trends in both historiography and in fiction by Czech, Slovak and 
Polish writers to suggest that recent historians’ emphasis on ‘bottom up’ history 
derives  to some extent from adopting literary techniques which allow history to be 
represented from the perspective of the ‘ordinary man’. Fiction allows us to focus on 
individuals with whom we potentially empathise rather than the broad movements and 
statistics of academic history, with possibly surprising results. Such fictions also have 
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the potential to challenge the all-pervasive simplistic binaries that characterise 
representations of dictatorship, for example when the erstwhile victim’s determination 
on vengeance causes him to become a perpetrator, as is the case in two of the texts 
James analyses. In reading a story they do not or cannot know, readers are encouraged 
to experience even familiar history as if for the first time, sometimes in an almost 
visceral, immersive manner as they empathise or even identify with even ostensibly 
unsympathetic characters, and this process can challenge established individual modes 
of thinking and even cultural paradigms. Drawing on Renate Lachmann’s discussion 
of literature as culture’s memory, James’s essay suggests the role literature might play 
not only in addressing previously taboo topics and creating a new language of 
mourning, such that the texts become lieux de mémoire, but also in constructing a new 
and more inclusive history of twentieth-century Europe, one that makes use of Eastern 
sources in order to challenge and complement a Western narrative of the Holocaust 
whose primary symbol is Auschwitz. This parallels similar movements at the political 
level, as discussed in David Clarke’s article in this special issue; however, literature is 
seen to offer something more than the political rhetoric on display in, for example, 
Latvian or Hungarian attempts to renegotiate hegemonic understandings of European 
history. 
At the same time however, the potential of literature to offer new perspectives 
on familiar or unfamiliar pasts may find itself in conflict with the powerful influence 
of more rigid schematic narrative templates. Conventional narratological wisdom 
would suggest that the first-person narrative facilitates a closer engagement or even 
empathy with the narrator and an understanding of complex emotions and 
motivations. However, such empathy was strikingly absent from many contemporary 
reviews of one of the most controversial first person narratives of life under state 
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socialism – Christa Wolf’s Was bleibt (1990). Many contemporary reviewers did not 
appear to appreciate the complexity of, in Tate’s terms, Wolf’s ‘evolving 
autobiographical project’, the elusive conception of the self and the rigorous self-
examination Wolf’s text demonstrated.46 Indeed, one of the foremost hostile critics, 
Ulrich Greiner, quite deliberately and explicitly set aside such narrative subtleties,47 
apparently only able or indeed determined to conceive of the text in accordance with 
the simple binary of victim / perpetrator that so often structures the production and 
reception of post-socialist narratives. The recourse to these simple binaries seems to 
militate against Aleida Assmann’s belief in the superiority of the literary text as a 
transmitter of cultural memory48 and points once again towards the importance of 
viewing potential (cultural) memory triggers within the socio-political context into 
which they are launched. After all, the ‘open community of readers’ that Aleida 
Assmann suggests as crucial to the creation of cultural memory might be supposed to 
imply open minded as well as large and disparate, with each individual reader 
engaging individually and in his or her own distinctive manner with the text.49  
However, John Heath’s discussion of the debates sparked by the posthumous 
outing of Romanian writer Oskar Pastior as an informer to the Securitate in 2010 
suggests that the ‘openness’ of that community might well have another dimension, 
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namely chronological. This can be understood as a result of shifting discourses about 
specific pasts within democratic memory cultures. By considering the debate about 
Pastior in the light of the public furore around Wolf’s Was bleibt and the subsequent 
revelations that she had acted as an informant, Heath demonstrates that the German 
example clearly influenced the treatment of its later Romanian counterpart – 
something we might understand in terms of premediation.50 Nonetheless, debates 
about how to read contentious sources have become more nuanced and there is greater 
empathy and differentiation in the treatment of the Romanian writer. If Wolf had 
functioned as a conveniently early catalyst for coming to terms with a whole political, 
social and literary system, Pastior’s case was dealt with much more upon his own 
personal terms and his work continued to be treated on its own merits. This may 
suggest that in the fullness of time, even more contentious literary texts about life 
under dictatorship will be read as the complex, possibly even contradictory literary 
constructs that they are, rather than being subsumed under the simple 
victim/perpetrator binaries that currently ‘authenticate’ them in the eyes of the reading 
public. It might be hoped that a more nuanced and complex understanding of the 
socialist past and our own relationship to it will emerge as a result.  
Political Memory 
It is in this potential for plurality that cultural memory differs from the final form of 
memory to be discussed in this essay: ‘political memory’. Aleida Assmann describes 
this form as the only mode of memory that can be described as ‘“collective”, in a 
narrower sense’. Political memory produces ‘strong bonds of loyalty’ and a ‘strong 
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unifying we-identity’. National memory is, for Assmann, a form of ‘official’ or 
‘political’ memory.51 She cites Ernest Renan as one of the earliest writers to recognise 
the significance of common historical experience for the construction of the nation.52 
The concept that communities, including national communities, are social 
constructions and based to a large extent on shared pasts also informs Hobsbawm and 
Ranger’s work on ‘the invention of tradition’ and Anderson’s discussion of ‘imagined 
communities’.53 The Marxist basis of Hobsbawm and Ranger’s analysis leads them to 
conceive of this in terms of ideology and hegemony: the identification of the 
constructed or ‘invented’ nature of traditions is seen to be a way of ensuring that their 
‘spell would be broken and automatically dissolved’.54 Nonetheless, as Assmann 
notes, the highlighting of the ‘false’ nature of certain representations of the past, 
reaffirms by contrast the possibility of an ‘authentic’ or ‘true’ portrayal.55 However, 
as we have seen, subjectivity, narrative and emplotment are key features of all 
representations of the past, including those that make up official or political memory. 
The question to be asked of elite appropriations of the past is not, therefore, if they are 
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‘true’ or ‘false’, but why they resonate (or not) with the wider population and the 
political consequences of their use.56 
These questions often form the starting point for political science and historical 
approaches to ‘collective memory’, that is, examination of state-level efforts to 
construct a particular version of the past that supports and binds citizens to a specific 
national identity. Several analyses have tracked efforts to (re)form political identity in 
the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe. Such efforts often 
involve the creation of new historical narratives that exclude communism from 
understandings of the national self.57 Some of the complexities of this process can be 
seen in Geoffrey Pridham’s exploration of the role of historical legacies in post-
socialist politics. Pridham demonstrates that historical legacies can both hinder and 
help democratic consolidation. In part, this relates to political structures, which must 
either be removed in the transition from authoritarian to liberal democratic 
governance, or which may serve as pre-socialist historical models in the 
reconfiguration of state-society relations. However, Pridham indicates that political 
values and attitudes might also be viewed as a legacy and can be equally significant in 
‘negative consolidation’, that is, the ‘final removal of the prospects for non-
democratic system alternatives’. 
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It is here that we see the interaction of memory politics with social or even 
individual remembering. Overcoming the past in this sense can mean changing the 
political attitudes of a population not used to democratic structures and conditioned by 
memories of dictatorial rule. In this way, the political sphere comes into contact with 
the seemingly private memories expressed by, for example, Morris’s informants. 
Nostalgia for state socialism is sometimes viewed as a symptomatic of the persistence 
of authoritarian attitudes, not only amongst the former elite, but also amongst 
‘ordinary’ voters. Where it is considered politically expedient to transform public 
attitudes towards the past in this regard (notably, not in Putin’s Russia), this 
frequently involves a direct confrontation with the crimes committed under the 
dictatorship through transitional justice, lustration or truth commissions.58 However, 
as Pridham shows, perhaps paradoxically, it is this confrontation with the past and the 
contestation that it necessarily entails that can prolong the influence of the 
authoritarian past on present political decision-making, as historical memory is ‘used 
for political or partisan advantage’, particularly in conflicts between former regime 
parties and the political right. 
The latter point is demonstrated clearly in David Clarke’s analysis of three 
nation-specific memory battles set within the broader European context. Clarke shows 
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that in the Baltic States, Hungary and Germany, the state socialist past continues to 
have significant influence in the politics of the present. Interestingly, in all three of 
these contexts, we see an interplay between the cultural and the political, as it is 
memorial media – monuments, films, museums – that appear to trigger debates at the 
political level, in which elite actors construct particular understandings of the national 
self. And yet the building of the House of Terror and Holocaust Memorial, or the 
filming of the Soviet Story can be viewed as acts of political memory designed to 
display a particular national image both internally and externally. Indeed, it is the 
positioning of national memory disputes within the wider European context that forms 
the core of Clarke’s analysis. The Baltic States’ attempt to co-opt the European Union 
in their memory wars with Russia through appeal to a shared ‘anti-totalitarianism’ 
may be similar in rhetoric to Fidesz’s anti-communism in Hungary; however, it 
emerges from quite different motivations based on domestic conflicts and results in a 
quite different representation of the EU. In contrast, in Germany, the appeal to an 
‘anti-totalitarian consensus’ at home is not matched by strong support for the efforts 
of Central and Eastern European countries to give the victims of the Gulag the same 
central position in European memory as the victims of the Holocaust.  
Levels of Memory 
Clarke’s contribution calls into question the very project of creating a unified 
European memory, which a number of scholars have advocated in recent years.59 The 
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participation in or lobbying for European memory projects, such as the Prague 
Declaration of 2008 or the Warsaw Declaration of 2011, might not reflect a desire to 
unite Europe through shared history, but to further domestic (memory) political 
concerns. It would seem then that national, ‘official’, memory is the primary motor of 
memory wars at the political level. And yet, as demonstrated by Skultans’s 
exploration of commemorations in the Baltic States, the political cannot be separated 
from social or cultural forms of remembering. The memory battles of the political 
elites are both driven by and resonate with the memories exchanged within specific 
communities, which, in turn, are in part constituted by the perception of a shared past. 
As Barahona de Brito argues, ‘people do not act only according to strategic 
calculations, but in light of the memories and narratives they have adopted and that 
make sense to them as members of a particular “memory group”’.60 Indeed, Pridham 
suggests that it is attitudes formed by such deeply rooted community remembering 
which are the most difficult to overcome in the process of negative consolidation.  
Memory mediated in cultural artefacts is also seen to play a key role in the 
memory battles at the political and social level: monuments, museums, films and 
literature are both the products of and triggers for debates that sometimes reach a 
surprising level of ferocity. Moreover, deeply-rooted narrative forms and genre 
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conventions structure remembering at individual, social and political level. 
Nonetheless, as argued above, it is perhaps the potential of culture, and particularly 
fiction, to present new worlds and perspectives and to elicit empathy with the ‘other’, 
which might permit a better understanding of the plurality of historical experience and 
promote reconciliation. Finally, each of these forms of memory is unthinkable without 
the individual, who produces, appropriates and remakes narratives about the past and 
who participates at each level of remembering. As Olick argues, ‘“memory” occurs in 
public and in private, at the tops of societies and at the bottoms, as reminiscence and 
as commemoration, as personal testimonial and as national narrative’.61 Taken 
together, the essays collected in this special issue demonstrate the ways in which these 
different kinds of memory are mutually constitutive and suggests that memory studies 
must truly work in trans- or interdisciplinary collaboration, if they are to do justice to 
the complex ways in which individuals and groups remember authoritarian pasts in 
the democratic media-culture societies of the present. 
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